Hi everyone !
Today I will analyze more precisely the case of the Nile Basin because it allows to address several issues of hydropolitics in Africa and to observe the panel of problems posed by sharing water. The case of the Nile Basin is a very good example of what is happening in many other parts of Africa and even if this case is well known, it remains nevertheless very interesting to this blog.
Reminder : the Nile is shared by 11 countries and is the 3rd largest watershed in the world, covering 10% of the African territory. It is formed by the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile at Khartoum, as we can see on the map above.
Of course, water plays a major role in the economic and political relations of this region and it is here that the concept of ‘hydropolitics' takes on its full meaning : 'the study of conflicts and cooperation around the sharing of water resources’ (Turhan, 2020). In an international context, the lack of water and the perception of having a limited resource increases tensions and risks of conflicts. Here, the sources of conflict come from three variables: ‘political tensions’, ‘lack of inclusive agreements between co-riparians countries’ and ‘unilateral action’ (Turhan, 2020).
It is also important to question the fact that water is not empirically responsible for conflicts between African countries because the continent has an abundant reservoir of groundwater of which largest groundwater volumes are found in the sedimentary aquifers in Sudan, Libya, Egypt and Chad. Therefore, it can be said that the source of the conflicts is a lack of water management. (Cascão et. al. 2019)
The case of the Nile Basin makes it possible above all to question the concepts of ‘hydropolitical security complex’ (HSC) which are actors that geographically share and use water resources from the same transboundary basin which have a strategic importance that determines the interstate relations between those countries ; the ‘regional security complex’ (RSC) which is the ‘security of actors interacting with security of others actors in the same regions therefore creating security interdependence among them’ and finally concept of ‘proxy politics’ which is where external parties get involved in the “internal” affairs of others (Cascão et. al. 2019).
Water management in the Nile Basin was regulated during the colonial period by the UK which controlled most of the basin, preferring Egypt to keep a recognised ‘aquired rights’ in the Nile water preventing the construction of any preheat that would significantly affect these rights and premise of the RSC. If Ethiopia has multiple times challenged this measure, it lacked capacity to reverse the trend ( Tawik, 2016).
It is interesting to note that it is indeed the colonial vision that initiated the first forms of inequality and conflict in this region. Therefore I shall ask to what extent do these concepts of water sharing are relevant and apply here ? What problems and solutions can raise the case of the Nile Basin on hydropolitics in Africa?
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam =
What characterizes these tensions is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Indeed, in February 2011, the Ethiopian Prime Minister announced the construction of a large dam in the Blue Nile that would allow Ethiopia to significantly increase its hydroelectricity production, increasing its trading capacity and allowing 6 million of its inhabitants to benefit from electricity.
This dam with exceptional capacities poses several geopolitical problems in the region. First, because it takes little or no account of the consequences for downstream countries (RSC). If Sudan can hope to reduce floods and increase irrigated agriculture potential, Egypt, on the other hand, sees a negative impact because the way in which the reservoir is filled can significantly reduce its water supply. This questions and highlights the concepts of ‘benefits-sharing’ (because the economic benefits of the dam are not even assured for Ethiopia (Tawik, 2019)) but also the concept of scale-related inequalities (cause benefits vary according to the scale on which one places oneself).
There is therefore a need for cooperation which culminates with the signing in March 2015 of Declaration of Principle (DoP) whose main idea is based on using the studies results of IPoE to define guidelines and rules and first annual filling operation. But owner of projects reserved right to adjust these rules which can creates tension and, despite that, no real agreement has been undertaken.
The fact that Ethiopia only wants national fundings and struggling to reach an agreement is a major source of tension. This also overcome the hegemony of the region since Ethiopia has a real power of pressure on Egypt. It passes from an ‘agriculture-based country , highly populated, with very little infrastructure development toward being one of the fastest growing economies in the African continent, attracting different external investors, with high ambitions of becoming a regional economic power wherein hydropower played a major role. (Movik, 2011).
By doing so, it has positioned itself as a partner of choice for foreign relations with a growing interest from the countries of the Middle East (‘proxy-politics') in particular that increase FDI, interests of private companies and banks. We can therefore notice the rapprochement between the Gulf countries and Sudan; Turkey and Egypt or Ethiopia (Cascão et. al. 2019).
So, these tensions reveal the problems of international cooperation, since these countries face a real problem of perception and lack of trust due to a historical context . It brings to light a scale-related problem , theorized by N. Fraser in 'Scales of Justice' which raises the question whether Ethiopia is legitimate to impose its dam on the scale of the region and the country and raises the question of who should manage and decide the Nile River ? Can someone decide and impose independently of others ? This illustrates the issue of governance.
Also, this exemplify many cases in Africa like cases of Limpopo River and Senqu River basin (Meissner & Ramasar, 2014) .
Thus, this particular case allowed us to explore various issues and concepts related to water sharing in Africa. It exposed the difficulties of cooperation, the fact that contrary to the European vision, water conflicts are not related to the quantity but to its political management and questions the importance of water for the development of a country and the power relations that this necessarily induces. Above all, it concerns the concept of international governance in the management of these conflicts and question the idea of ‘water wars’ where water is more lethal than life-saving, concept that we will discuss in a future post.
So…I hope that you will have found this article interesting to understand the different issues that the case of the Nile basin allows us to address in the framework of politics and water in Africa !!
Thank you for your reading !!
The case study of Nile Basin is an interesting choice and you have done a nice job teasing out various actors and scales of interaction that constitute a source of contention. There seem to be more discussion about Ethiopia, and I wonder what the perspective from Egypt could be but also Sudan.
ReplyDeleteThank you for your comment. I'll try to consider Egypt and Sudan perspective in my following posts.
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